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Mark Young argues that intellectual virtues can serve as a foundation for argument 
norms. This locates argument norms in intellectually virtuous agents who have a 
desire for epistemically valuable ends and the right intellectual motivations and 
dispositions. To show how intellectually virtuous motivations and dispositions 
develop and help us to act virtuously, Young makes use of Martha Nussbaum’s 
notion of ‘grounding experiences’. Argument norms develop on the basis of 
empirical information gained through grounding experiences about the kinds of 
intellectual motivations and dispositions most likely to lead to true belief. A key 
advantage of Young’s position over accounts that use pretheoretical intuition to 
ground argument norms is that it can avoid problems such as relativism. Because I 
basically agree with Young’s position and find it very promising, in the following I 
focus on four respects in which his account might be further expanded. 
 
2. POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS 
 
First, it would help to develop the discussion about mapping spheres of human 
belief beyond Nussbaum’s account using work in reliabilist and responsibilist virtue 
epistemologies. Reliabilist virtue epistemologies focus on the reliability of belief-
forming processes, faculties, dispositions, or epistemic agents in relation to 
epistemic values such as truth or justification. (Goldman, 1993; Sosa, 1980; Greco, 
1999) Responsibilist virtue epistemologies focus more attention on the obligations 
of epistemic agents in different contexts. Epistemic responsibility (Code, 1984) or 
epistemic conscientiousness (Montmarquet, 1993) are central virtues orienting us 
towards epistemically valuable ends such as truth or justification. Both are relevant 
to Young’s argument insofar as these epistemologies ground epistemological 
concepts and values in the intellectually virtuous agent. Empirical facts about the 
agent and the agent’s intellectual environment are important in each subtype of 
virtue epistemology and each can support causal accounts of rational norms. In my 
view, reliabilist and responsibilist approaches are both needed to ground rational 
norms: we develop our cognitive characters in biological, psychological, emotional, 
social, epistemic, and moral ways. So, while Nussbaum’s grounding experiences are 
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clearly a part of this epistemological literature, it would help to situate explicitly the 
question of argument norms in a broader virtue epistemic context. 
My second point stems from a concern about intellectual vice and 
‘dysfunctional’ intellectual environments. You may have encountered individuals 
who excel in part because they overvalue their own thinking and undervalue the 
thinking of others in contexts that reward such behavior. Or perhaps you have 
encountered academics who routinely silence their own critical voices because of 
epistemic injustice (Fricker, 2007), but who acquire knowledge successfully 
nonetheless. Robert Roberts and Jay Wood consider the problem of dysfunctional 
intellectual contexts in their examination of the value of intellectual humility. They 
say: 
 
If it did turn out that intellectual vanity and arrogance delivered, on average, more 
of the epistemic goods than intellectual humility, we would try to explain this 
disturbing result by reference to some other fault in the individual or some 
corruption in the epistemic environment. Perhaps individuals need vanity as a 
motivation, because their upbringing does not instill in them enthusiasm for 
knowledge as such. Or we might locate the pathology socially—say, in the fact that 
the whole intellectual community is warped by vanity and arrogance, hyper-
autonomy and unhealthy competitiveness, so that in that fallen community some 
vices actually become more “functional” than their counterpart virtues. (Roberts & 
Wood, 2007, p. 252) 
 
You can acquire truths with intellectual vice in dysfunctional intellectual 
environments and intellectual vice may be the best way to do so in such 
environments. Underscoring this concern, perhaps, is Feyerabend’s (1975) view 
that the successful acquisition of knowledge might result from the amount of time 
you spend working on a problem rather than the particular methodologies (or, I 
would add, virtues) you employ. So really, how important are intellectual virtues for 
guiding inquiry or argument towards epistemically valuable ends? Important 
enough to serve as the foundation for argument norms? I am inclined to think they 
are important enough, just as I am inclined to think that knowledge acquisition is 
ultimately hampered by intellectual vice. But more work is needed to show that 
intellectual virtue ultimately outperforms intellectual vice, particularly if we wish to 
use virtue for argument norms.   
A third issue involves the relationship between intellectual virtues and 
ethotic arguments. (Brinton, 1986; Leff, 2009; Walton, 1999) If intellectual virtues 
function as argument norms—that is, if argument norms arise from intellectually 
virtuous agents—then we could technically classify all informal arguments as 
ethotic. Given that epistemic trust is vital to the development and sharing of 
knowledge, this idea might have some merit. But because many still think of ethotic 
arguments as weaker than other kinds of inductive argument, grounding argument 
norms in ethos could be a hard sell. It might be worthwhile, then, to work out some 
of the relationships between Young’s position and ethotic argumentation. 
My last point concerns the role of community in the development and 
exercise of intellectual virtue. Young says that in his account “the norms of reason, 
or argument, would not rest in language but instead in the intellectually virtuous 
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agent.” I do not dispute the location of norms in intellectually virtuous agents but we 
should also emphasize the role of intellectual communities in the development, 
exercise, and protection of these norms. The idea of the ‘intellectually virtuous 
agent’ invites association with ideals of autonomy, impartiality, and independence. 
But these characteristics may undermine the development of intellectually virtuous 
cognitive selves as well as the exercise of intellectual virtue in shared inquiry. Causal 
pathways and perspicuous maps engage what intellectual communities do and how 
cognitive characters develop in different and often overlapping intellectual 
communities, including those involving peers, families, schools, universities, 
workplaces, libraries, labs, online media sites, and so on. Learning about intellectual 
virtues involves learning about people in communities, perhaps especially those 
with whom one is closest. Christine McKinnon says that 
 
When it is knowledge of other persons that is in question, we have seen that there 
are good reasons not to insist on the impartiality of the knower. Indeed, in these 
kinds of quest, the identity and many of the interests of the investigating cognitive 
agent will be relevant … But neither the cognitive agent’s undertaking—which is 
informed along the many dimensions of her character—nor the criteria for the 
success of her undertaking—which can be provided only against the background of 
the relevant communal practices—can be understood unless the role of her 
subjective perspective and her relation to those others is taken into account. A 
parent’s impartial attitude towards his children will impede his getting to know 
them. It may also inhibit his children from getting to know themselves. (McKinnon, 
2003, p. 236) 
 
It may be more productive, then, to think in terms of intellectually virtuous 
communities rather than individual agents. Such an approach would align with 
insights from the area of rhetorical argumentation about the audience’s role in 
establishing argument norms. (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969; Tindale, 2004) 
The idea of a ‘shared cognitive environment’—that is, the overlap between groups of 
people in terms of what they know and assume (Tindale 2004, p. 22)—can be 
extended to the case of intellectual virtue. How an agent expresses, regulates, and 
develops intellectual virtues in the course of learning, arguing, or experimenting is a 
function of a shared cognitive environment. So, shared cognitive environments 




Young argues—successfully in my view—that we need not rely on unreflective 
intuitions to ground argument norms and that intellectual virtues can ground them 
instead. His suggestion is engaging, provocative, and has interesting implications for 
a variety of issues in argumentation. In response, I have suggested a few options for 
further exploration including relevant work in reliabilist and responsibilist virtue 
epistemologies, the problem of achieving epistemic value through intellectual vice, 
the relation of virtuous argument norms to ethotic argument, and the role of 







Brinton, A. (1986). Ethotic argument. History of Philosophy Quarterly, 3, 245-257. 
Code, L. (1984). Toward a Responsibilist Epistemology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 
65, 29-50. 
Feyerabend, P. (1975). Against Method. London: New Left Books. 
Fricker, M. (2007). Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Goldman, A. (1993). Epistemic folkways and scientific epistemology. In A. Goldman (Ed.), Readings in 
Philosophy and Cognitive Science (pp. 95-116, Ch. 5). Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 
Leff, M. (2009). Perelman, ad hominem argument, and rhetorical ethos. Argumentation, 23, 301-311. 
Sosa, E. (1980). The raft and the pyramid: coherence versus foundations in the theory of knowledge. 
Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 5, 3-25. 
Greco, J. (1999). Agent Reliabilism. In J. Tomberlin (Ed.), Philosophical Perspectives, 13, Epistemology 
(pp. 273-96). Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing Co. 
McKinnon, C. (2003). Knowing cognitive selves. In M. DePaul & L. Zagzebski (Eds.), Intellectual 
Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology (pp. 227-253, Ch. 10). Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Montmarquet, J. (1993). Epistemic Virtue and Doxastic Responsibility. Lanham, MD: Rowman and 
Littlefield. 
Perelman, C. & Olbrechts-Tyteca, L. (1969). The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation. Notre 
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. 
Roberts, R. & Wood, J. (2007). Intellectual Virtues: An Essay in Regulative Epistemology. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Tindale, C. (2004). Rhetorical Argumentation: Principles of Theory and Practice. Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Sage Publications. 
Walton, D. (1999). Ethotic arguments and fallacies: the credibility function in multi-agent dialogue 
systems. Pragmatics and Cognition, 7, 177-203. 
